Student’s Name
Professor’s Name
Course
Date
Frege’s Puzzle and the Sense-Reference Distinction
The Frege’s puzzle about identity is a puzzle developed by Gottlob Frege about proper names and semantics. The puzzle was developed to explain the concept of identity where one object can have different identities in reference. According to Frege’s puzzle, the identity of an item can be described with names that are different, but refereeing to the same object. The discussion about the Frege’s puzzle will explain the concept and the problem of substitutivity. The discussion will seek to explore how sense/reference distinction as presented by Frege solved the problems as well as an objection to the distinction.
A significant part of Frege’s puzzle was the description of the identity of the planet Venus. The planet is the same despite having reference names that are different. The Venus is known to be two different stars; the morning star and the evening star. While the two names are different, and seem to be opposite of each other, they are used to refer to the same planet (Bernecker 1). The statements that Frege introduces to describe this puzzle is the following;
The first statement A is; Hesperus is Hesperus.
The second statement B is; Hesperus is Phosphorus
The first statement describes the planet Venus as the evening star. The second statement describes the same planet, Venus as the morning star. According to Frege, the statements would also be represented as (Bernecker 1);
Venus = Evening Star
Venus = Morning Star
According to Frege, this case shows two descriptions of the same thing. The puzzle is that the two different descriptions give identity statements are represented as;
Morning Star = Evening Star, and Evening Star = Morning Star.
In the statement above, the two statements should be taken as synonymous with each other (Bernecker 1). In presenting these statements, it is worth noting that Venus is regarded to be a star, which is not a fact because it is a planet. The morning star name comes from the appearance of Venus in the sky in the morning dawn, while the evening star comes from the appearance of the planet in the evening (Bernecker 1). However, the two sentences present a fundamental problem with the Frege’s puzzle.
In presenting the puzzle, Frege also conveys a problem of substitutivity. In the two statements above, the problem arises where they should be synonymous but are not. This is what Frege calls the cognitive value. The two statements have the same meaning, but they are considered to differ in their meaning by their cognitive value. The first statement A is a truth of logic; while the second statement B, is an empirical truth or the priori (Bernecker, Problems with Fregeanism 2). However, the problem arises because the two statements are considered to only have reference and no meaning beyond that. However, this problem seems to be in the fact that the two statements should mean the same (Bernecker, Problems with Fregeanism 2). This is the problem is further presented in the second problem of the Frege’s puzzle.
The problem of substitutivity exists where the two names can be substituted without a change in the true value. In this case, if the first name is given a description, the second should carry the meaning of the description as well. For instance, if one says “Hesperus is bright, and then it should be also true to say that “Phosphorus is bright.”This can be termed as the problem of substituting one description identity something with another, while refereeing to the same subject (Mendelsohn 92). The substitution of the names gives a problem of forming invalid statements. This can be described in the example below;
a) John believes Phosphorus shines in the morning
b) Phosphorus =Hesperus
c) John believes that Hesperus shines in the morning
The three statements above illustrate how the problem of substitutivity exists. This is because the first statement is valid and refers to Venus as the morning star. In this case, John believes that it shines in the morning, and is a valid argument (Bernecker 1). This argument is also factual because it can be verified by observers. The second statement illustrates the Frege’s puzzle where the two names carry the same cognitive value. However, the third statement is invalid. The statement is invalid because it refers to the “Evening Star” as the “Morning Star” for it to shine in the morning. The reference of “Evening Star” as the “Morning Star” arises from the second statement that equates phosphorus and Hesperus, thereby giving them the same cognitive value.
At the same time, it is good to note that the two names refer to the same planet, despite the last statement being invalid. If the word Venus is used, the statement would get back its meaning. This shows that the meanings attached to names usually tend to go beyond the reference (Mendelsohn 54). As a result, the Frege’s puzzle about identity and substitutivity attracts the fundamental problem.
To solve the puzzle and the substitutivity problems, Frege proposed the sense/reference distinction. The solution by Frege is presented in two ways; the sense and the reference aspects. The first solution as proposed by Frege is to postulate another level of meaning of the names beside the reference function. Frege referred this second level of meaning as the sense. Sense in this case is the rules for finding the reference (Bernecker, Fregean Senses 1). According to Frege, the sense is the difference in the way an object can be presented to us, or the mode that the object is presented to us. Applying this solution to the case above would give ‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus’ difference in the sense, as they are considered to present the planet Venus in different ways. This is in addition to the two names having the same reference.
The second solution proposed by Frege is to appeal to the distinction between reference and the sense. In taking this solution, Frege holds that the reference of a name shifts to its ordinary sense if the appropriate name occurs in the right context of the right subject and in the right attitude report (Mendelsohn 147). Therefore, ‘Phosphorus’, in the first sentence a, denotes the planet Venus and represents the reference. However, the same name denotes its ordinary sense in an attitude report, when it appears in the third sentence c. The Application of this solution in the case above would solve the problem.
However, Frege’s sense-reference distinction has been objected to. One of the objections is the semantic-pragmatic distinction presented by Bertrand Russell. Russell objects to Frege in two main ways. First, he objects to Frege by stating that sense is purely semantic. Semantics in this case deal with non-contextual meanings of names or sentences (Bernecker, Pragmatics 1). Secondly, Russell objects to Frege’s combination of sense and reference. In these objections, Russell primarily deals with propositions and explains that they are not subject to any linguistic abstracts. These objections therefore show that Russell believed that most English names carry higher meanings that are beyond their reference (Mendelsohn 57). Therefore, such names cannot be used for reference only or their meanings be substituted without applying the appropriate pragmatic propositions.
Works Cited
Bernecker, Sven. Phil 1: Introduction to Philosophy; Lecture 2.3, Frege on Sense and Reference, University of California, Irvine, 2015, Print
Bernecker, Sven, Fregean Senses. Phil 1: Introduction to Philosophy; Lecture 2.4, University of California, Irvine, 2015, Print
Bernecker, Sven, Problems with Fregeanism. Phil 1: Introduction to Philosophy; Lecture 2.5, University of California, Irvine, 2015, Print
Bernecker, Sven, Pragmatics. Phil 1: Introduction to Philosophy; Lecture 2.6, University of California, Irvine, 2015, Print
Mendelsohn, Richard. The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005